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Abstract This paper examines the occurrence and impact
of gender discrimination in access to production resources on
the income, productivity, and technical efficiency of farmers.
Through an empirical investigation of farmers from Kous-
sin-Le´le´, a semi-collective irrigated rice scheme in central
Benin, we find that female rice farmers are particularly dis-
criminated against with regard to scheme membership and
access to land and equipment, resulting in significant nega-
tive impacts on their productivity and income. Although
women have lower productivity, they are as technically
efficient as men. The findings suggest that there is consid-
erable scope for improving the productivity of women
through increasing their access to production resources.
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Introduction
For the majority of developing countries, women play an
important role in agricultural production in general and in
rice production in particular (Carney 1993; Dey 1984,
1981, 1982). It is reported that women contribute up to
about 60% of agricultural production, 80% of food crop
production and participate in more than 60% of rice pro-
duction operations, processing, and marketing (CTA 2002).
Nevertheless, despite the important role of women in
agriculture, their access and control of capital resources
such as land is limited (Saito 2004). Even in those situa-
tions where women have access to production resources,
they do not have full control over their use because men
dominate any decision-making (Quisumbing 1996). For
example, in the largely patriarchal society of Benin,
women have limited access to land due to discriminatory
laws and inheritance rights (Kidane et al. 2006; Dijoux
2002; Sohinto 2001; Honlonkou 1994; Biaou 1993, 1991).
Although recent data are not available, Kidane et al. (2006)
observes that in Benin the average size of men’s land
holdings was 1.76 ha in 1976, while that of women’s was
only 0.98 ha.
Such disparities are a cause of concern to development
practitioners. In acknowledgement of the role of women in
development, gender equity has been included as an
important component of the ‘‘millennium development
goals’’ (MDG). In conformity with the MDG, national
policies have been formulated to reduce the current gender
disparities by encouraging access to resources through
increased participation by women in economic, political,
and social-cultural development.
Rice is an important crop in West Africa and it is an
important source of income and food for producers. In
Benin, rice is believed to be one of the crops that have
significantly contributed to food security and poverty
reduction (Ahoyo 1996; Hounde´kon 1996; Kpobli 2000;
Ade´gbola and Sodjinou 2003). However, any pro-poor
policies that aim at reducing poverty through agriculture,
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particularly rice production, will not achieve their intended
objectives if they fail to address the current inequalities in
access to production resources between men and women.
The development of irrigated rice schemes managed
collectively by groups of smallholder farmers is one
strategy that governments have used to both increase
smallholder farmers’ access to production resources and
reduce gender inequality. This strategy is consistent with
the ‘‘gender and development approaches’’ (GAP), which
may involve the use of collective action groups and which
are strategic tools for transforming the social relations
between men and women and between other social cate-
gories toward equality of rights and duties, social status,
power, and responsibilities (Reeves and Baden 2000).
Besides seeking to change existing gender roles and rela-
tions, the strategic goal of the GAP is to harmonize social
relations and reduce inequalities for an equitable and sus-
tainable development (Lambrou 2005; Juteau 2000; ICRA
1999; Quisumbing 1996; Boserup 1983).
However, unless they avoid replicating inequalities that
exist in their communities, women will reap limited ben-
efits from collective action groups. Indeed, as observed by
Pandolfelli et al. (2007b), collective action programs that
fail to address gender, or that target women as beneficiaries
without a clear understanding of gender relations within the
community, risk being ineffective and further disempow-
ering women. Pandolfelli et al. (2007a) further observe that
the complexity of both gender and collective action means
that even if development practitioners, policymakers, and
local stakeholders are genuinely interested in using col-
lective action groups to reduce poverty and foster gender
equity, favorable outcomes are not automatic.
The Koussin-Le´le´ irrigation scheme of Benin is an
example of a collective action group. The scheme was
established in 1969 by the Chinese mission in Benin to
promote rice production and contribute to the development
of the region. The scheme was managed for its first quarter
century (1969–1994) as a collective. But, since 1995
farmers have adopted an organizational system of indi-
vidual ownership and management of plots, while still
retaining the collective management of the production
materials and equipments. The scheme has been charac-
terized by discrimination against women since its
establishment in 1969. For example, only 16% of the
members of the scheme are currently women, while their
average land holding is a third that of the men (Kinking-
ninhoun-Meˆdagbe´ 2003). The inequalities in access to land
and equipment between men and women negatively affect
the productivity of women farmers.
The principal objective of this paper is to examine the
effect of gender discrimination in access to production
resources among farmers from the Koussin-Le´le´ rice
scheme. More specifically, the paper analyzes the effect of
gender inequality in access to land and equipment on
productivity, income, and technical efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
‘‘Methods and procedures’’ provides a brief description of
the methodology used in the paper. The results of the
analysis are detailed in section ‘‘Results’’, in which we
describe the inequalities in access to land and use of
equipment as well as their impact on the income, produc-
tivity, and technical efficiency of farmers. We discuss these
results in section ‘‘Discussion’’ and offer conclusions and
recommendations in section ‘‘Conclusion’’.
Methods and procedures
Description of the study site and historical background
The irrigation scheme of Koussin-Le´le´ is located in the
central part of Benin. The scheme covers a total area of
106 ha which benefits from a water distribution network of
10,068 m in length and from a 610 m-long drainage net-
work. It is irrigated using a gravitational irrigation system.
Established in 1969 by the Chinese mission, the scheme
has presently a total of 145 producers, including 23
women. The producers are subdivided into seven groups,
six male groups and one female group. The seven groups
constitute the Rice Farmers Union of Koussin-Le´le´ (UPR-
KL), which is led by a management council (CA). Each
farmer is allocated a rice plot which he or she manages
individually. Other production factors such as equipment,
fertilizer and credit are distributed to farmers through
group leaders and are managed collectively.
The scheme has undergone several changes in terms of
membership as well as in its management. In its first
25 years, all production activities (including access to
capital and equipment) and all income generated were
managed collectively. A multidisciplinary Chinese team
initially led the management of the scheme before trans-
ferring it to farmers. The Chinese team recruited and
trained exclusively male farmers,1 organized them into a
cooperative subdivided into teams and later into groups
structured around rice production activities. Portions of
land of varying sizes were delimited by posts and allocated
by the Chinese to the different groups, with larger groups
getting relatively more land. Later (in 1978), the Chinese
transferred the management of the scheme to producers but
still continued assisting them. Each team of producers had
a leader elected by a general assembly while an executive
1 The Chinese did not explicitly target men. But they ended up
getting only men to work with them because in Benin (and most of
Africa), men do not often authorize their wives or daughters to work
with strangers.
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committee of three elected members managed the groups.
The teams and the groups were coordinated by a man-
agement committee (CA) that was responsible for the
organization of the cropping season, the management of the
infrastructure, and the equipment and financial aspects of
the scheme. Until 1994, except for one individual, all
women working in the scheme were employed as laborers
by male members of the scheme.2
Due to governance problems and internal conflicts
among cooperative members the collective form of orga-
nization of the Koussin-Le´le´ scheme has persistently failed
to realize its potential production. A series of successive
reforms in the collective management of the scheme took
place without significant changes in the collective form of
organization of the scheme.
The end result of the persistent failure of the cooperative
form was a gradual decline in the scheme’s activities and
production that culminated in the withdrawal of many
cooperative members in 1993. However, following
exchange visits to other irrigated schemes in other parts of
Benin, producers adopted in 1995 an organizational system
based on individual management of the rice plots while
maintaining the collective management of the equipment
and infrastructure. The group leaders were given the
responsibility of distributing the scheme’s land allocated to
each group. Thus, each group member received a portion of
land that was allocated to its group with an obligation to
pay fees to the union according to the number of cultivated
plots. The women workers were, however, excluded from
the land distribution because men wanted to continue using
them as laborers. But, after repeated revolts and the inter-
vention of district authorities, women were allowed in 1995
to form their own group and were allocated plots of land.
The plots allocated to women were, nevertheless, fewer
and smaller than those allocated to men.
Currently, all the agricultural equipment in the scheme
is owned and managed collectively. The Union Manage-
ment Council distributes the equipment to the groups, and
group leaders decide on their utilization in their respective
groups. For women groups, however, the Union Manage-
ment Council decides on the use of the equipment.
Fertilizer and insecticide supply is also usually arranged
collectively and on credit through the communal union of
farmers (UCP). Based on individual input requirements, the
general secretary makes requests to the UCP after con-
sulting with the president and the treasurer of the group.
The same procedure is used for the cash credit that is also
taken collectively from the local agricultural credit
company (CLCAM). Both forms of credit (in-kind inputs
and cash) are recovered in bags of rice equivalent to the
value of credit.
Sampling and data collection
The data used in the study were collected from a sample of
rice farmers in the scheme in August 2004 by the Pro-
gramme d’Analyse de la Politique Agricole (PAPA) of the
Institut National de la Recherche Agricole du Be´nin (IN-
RAB). The scheme’s population of 145 farmers, of which
23 are women, constituted the sampling frame. A stratified
random sampling technique was used to ensure adequate
representation of women and men in the sample. Twenty
women (almost all the women in the scheme) were selected
from the female stratum and 25 men (about 20% of the men
in the scheme) were selected from the male stratum,
leading to a total sample size of 45.
The data were collected using structured questionnaires,
non-structured discussions with individual farmers, semi-
structured and structured focus group discussions, and
through literature review. The questionnaire captured
information for the 2003–2004 cropping season on quan-
tities of inputs and outputs, prices of inputs and outputs,
area cultivated, types and quantity of labor,3 as well as
some socio-demographic characteristics of the farmers.
The focus group discussions were conducted in each of the
seven groups to obtain qualitative information on their
organization and functioning, on the history of the suc-
cessive management forms used in the scheme and their
bearing on the outcomes of the groups’ management and
on the production outcomes of members.
The study has some limitations with respect to the
sampling, firstly, because of the small sample size. A
second limitation of the study is the fact that the sample did
not include farmers who are not members of the scheme.
Therefore, only the discrimination against women who
have access to the scheme (i.e., discrimination inside the
scheme) can be studied using this sample. Extending the
analysis to all women around the scheme area in general
would reduce the potential bias associated with restricting
the sample to participants in the scheme only.
The theoretical and empirical frameworks
Technical efficiency expresses the ability to obtain the
maximum output from a given level of productive resour-
ces (Green 1997; Atkinson and Cornwell 1993; Atkinson
and Cornwell 1994). Thus, technical efficiency corresponds
2 This woman was integrated into the co-operative in 1989 following
the death of her husband, a former co-operator. She came and worked
with him in the scheme. She is currently the president of the women-
only group.
3 Norman conversion method adapted to the context and to the
specificities of Koussin-Le´le´ scheme was used to estimate the
quantity of labor.
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to the efficiency in physical production and refers to the
technical organization of a production activity. The level of
technical inefficiency of a particular farmer is measured by
the deviation of the observed farmer’s output from the
value of some potential or frontier production representing
the potential or maximum possible output that any farmer
can achieve using the same level of inputs and the same
production technology (Battese 1992; Green 1993). Battese
(1992) further defines technical inefficiency of a firm as the
factor by which the level of production for the firm is less
than its frontier output and gives updated accounts of
frontier production functions associated with the estimation
of technical inefficiency of individual firms.4
Two approaches are used in the literature to estimate the
frontier production and the distribution of farmer technical
efficiencies (Green 1997): the deterministic and stochastic
frontiers production approaches. The deterministic pro-
duction frontiers assume that all deviations from the
production frontiers are due to inefficiency. The assump-
tion that all deviations from the maximum output
achievable are due to technical inefficiency is, however,
unrealistic because there are several other unobserved
factors farmers are not able to control (climate, tempera-
ture, etc.) and which can make observed output deviate
from the potential. Measurement errors in the observed
output and inputs are also not accounted for. In addition,
statistical inferences cannot be made for the technical
efficiency and production parameters estimated with the
deterministic approach (Green 1997). These shortcomings
have led to the development of the now widely used sto-
chastic production frontiers approach, which decomposes
the deviation of observed output from the potential into two
unobserved components: a symmetric error term which
corresponds to the usual measurement error and the inef-
ficiency term. The present study uses the stochastic
production frontiers approach to estimate the determinants
and distribution of famer technical efficiency. The sto-
chastic frontier production function (with a Cobb-Douglas
functional form) is given by the following expression:
lnyi ¼ b0 þ
XK
k¼1
bklnxik þ vi  ui ð1Þ
where yi represents the observed output of the ith sample
farm; xi ¼ xi1; . . .; xiKð Þ is the vector of the observed basic
inputs (land, labor, seed, fertilizer, etc.); bk; k ¼ 1; . . .; K
are the parameters that define the production frontiers
technology and which are to be estimated; ui is a one-sided
non-negative random variable (usually assumed to follow a
truncated normal distribution) that measures the systematic
deviation of log of output from the log of the potential; and
vi, is the usual symmetric measurement error (including the
effect of non-observed factors that affect production).
The individual farm-level technical inefficiency index is
estimated by:
TEi ¼ exp u^ið Þ ð2Þ
where uˆi is the estimated one-sided error in Eq. 1. Thus, the
technical inefficiency index TEi is always between 0 and 1.
The farmer is technically efficient when TEi reaches its
maximum value, which is 1. Otherwise he or she is tech-
nically inefficient and therefore can potentially achieve
higher output for the same level of inputs (or, equivalently,
higher marginal productivity at all levels of input use).5
With the Cobb-Douglas production frontiers, the farmer’s
realized marginal factor productivity for an input k (the
increase in output resulting from a marginal increase in the
input) is simply the average factor productivity (output per
unit input) for the input, yi/xik, multiplied by the corre-
sponding coefficient bk in Eq. 1.
In general, a large part of the technical inefficiency of a
farmer is explained by some socio-demographic factors
such as age, education, sex, and other household demo-
graphic factors (Kalirajan 1981; Pitt and Lee 1981; Battese
1992). Thus, following Battese and Coelli (1995), the
dependence of the technical inefficiency of a farmer on the
socio-demographic factors is formulated as:
ui ¼ dzi þ ei ð3Þ
where zi is the vector of farmer socio-demographic vari-
ables, d is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ei is a
normally distributed random variable with zero mean and
truncation point defined by ei   dzi. The vector of
parameters d is estimated jointly with the technological
parameters of the production function using a maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure (Green 1997; Bat-
tese and Coelli 1995; Battese et al. 1996).
The present study focuses on the observed inequality in
access to productive resources (land and farm equipment)
between men and women in the Koussin-Le´le´ rice scheme
and its effect on their productivities and technical effi-
ciencies. For that purpose, we hypothesize the existence of
significant discrimination in access to land and equipment
between men and women in the scheme. We do not
hypothesize any discrimination in the use of other inputs
such as seed and fertilizer as they can be acquired through
4 Technical efficiency does not imply allocative or economic
efficiency, however. Allocative efficiency means that resources are
used so that the value of an additional unit of output (the value of the
marginal product) is equal to the cost of an additional unit of input.
Thus, technically inefficient farmers may be allocatively efficient,
vice versa (Green 1993). But, technical and allocative efficiencies are
necessary for a farmer to be economically efficient. In this paper we
focus only on technical efficiency.
5 For more details about this method and the relatives basic
equations, please see Green 1997; Battese et al. 1996; Battese and
Coelli 1995.
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other means, while land and equipment are acquired only
through the scheme. We test discrimination on access to
land directly by comparing the means of land holding size
between the men and women groups. For access to
equipment we use the fact that discrimination in the use of
equipment causes delays in transplanting rice seedlings
from the nursery to the main fields; this enables us to test
for gender discrimination indirectly by comparing the
mean ages of the nurseries of men and women on the day
of transplanting.
One of the major hypotheses in this paper is that without
discrimination on land and equipment there would be no
difference in productivity and technical efficiency between
men and women. We test this hypothesis by testing for the
equality of means in the average and marginal productiv-
ities, net rice income, and technical efficiency indices
between men and women. We also test the hypothesis that
women are as technically efficient as men by testing the
hypothesis that the coefficient for gender in the equation
for the determinants of technical inefficiency (Eq. 3) is
equal to zero. The Statistical software Stata version 9 was
used to compute the summary statistics estimate the
parameters of the stochastic production frontier and the
technical efficiency equations and conduct the statistical
tests described above. All the estimation and test proce-
dures took into account the stratified sample design and
small sample size.
Results
Characteristics of rice farmers
Table 1 presents the socio-demographic characteristics of
the sample rice farmers disaggregated by gender and social
status, with the probability indicating results from a dif-
ference of means test between men and women. The results
indicate that women, who account for 45% of the sampled
rice farmers, are on average older (55 years) than men
(38 years).6 The youngest rice farmer is a 21-year-old man
and the oldest a 75-year-old woman. The average house-
hold size is six and is not significantly different across
gender. On average, there are 2.51 active household
members of working age in a household for 3.5 inactive
ones.7 The average dependency ratio is 1.48 and is not
significantly different across gender of the farmer.8 With
regard to education, the overall primary school attendance
rate from the Koussin-Le´le´ scheme is 45%; a school
attendance rate lower than the regional average of about
59% (INSAE 2002). Only 7% of women had attended
primary school compared to 56% of male farmers. In
addition, 31% of the farmers had received some profes-
sional training in non-farm activities (sewing, carpentry,
bricklaying, etc.), which constitute secondary activities for
some of the farmers, rice farming being always the prin-
cipal activity. The average length of experience in rice
farming is 11 years, with no significant differences across
gender.
Evidence of gender discrimination
Three forms of discrimination were observed in the
scheme. The first form of discrimination relates to the low
proportion of women participating in rice production in the
scheme. Out of a total population of 145 rice farmers in the
scheme, only 23 are women. There are six male groups
against one female group, and the female population rep-
resents less than 16% of the total population of rice farmers
in the scheme. Considering that women represent 52% of
the Benin population and 40% of farmers (INSAE 2002),
their low participation in this scheme appears to suggest
that women are discriminated against.
Discrimination in access to land
The second form of discrimination relates to the land size,
as shown by farmer access to resources and use of inputs.
The results in Table 2 indicate that on average, rice farmers
cultivate 0.51 ha of land. The comparison of these values
across gender shows that women cultivate on average
0.24 ha of land, which is a third of the average of 0.72 ha
cultivated by men. The difference is statistically significant
at the 1% significance level (p-value less than 0.001).
Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination in
access to land between men and women. In fact, the man
with the smallest piece of land has the same area as the
female with the largest land area (0.27 ha). Furthermore,
while male group leaders are responsible for land redis-
tribution to their members using performance criteria such
as level of field cleaning and yield as a basis to allocate
additional land to better performing farmers, women’s
group members are given land by the union management
6 One rice farmer was eliminated because he had problems during the
season and the data collected from him was not complete.
7 In the study area, children start working in the rice farms when they
are above 10 years old. The conversion of rice farm household
members into equivalent-adult (Eq.adt) was made using the FAO/
OMS scale. According to this scale, a man whose age is between 15
and 65 years is equal to 1 Eq.adt; a woman at the same scale of age is
Footnote 7 continued
equal to 0.8 Eq.adt; a child of less than 15 years or a person older
than 65 years is equivalent to 0.5 Eq.adt.
8 The estimated average dependency ratio is similar to the 1.5
estimated ratio for part of the Republic of Benin by Floquet and
Mongbo (1998).
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council (UMC), which has never applied the performance
criteria to allocate more land to performing women farm-
ers. Instead the later have experienced a further reduction
in land size when they were forced to accept other women
farmers into their group.
Gender discrimination in access to equipment
The third form of discrimination relates to the use of
equipment. Equipments such as the motor-cultivators, used
for both field plowing and rice transportation, are collec-
tively managed by each group. Each group is given a motor
cultivator and a driver to ensure timely plowing and timely
transportation of paddy from the field to the storage rooms
after the harvest. However, in contrast to men’s groups, the
women group is given a motor-cultivator but not a driver.
This implies that they can not start plowing their fields until
the drivers for the men’s groups complete plowing the
men’s fields. This leads to a delay in plowing the women’s
fields, forcing them to plant late. Using the age of a nursery
as a proxy for the timing of planting, the results in Table 2
indicate that on average women planted their rice much
later (25 days) than men (19 days). The difference is sta-
tistically different from zero at the 1% significance level
(p-value less than 0.001).
Planting late and subsequently harvesting late leads to
significant yield losses for the women. Another consequence
of the discrimination on access to plowing equipment relates
Table 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of rice farms
Indicator Total (n = 45) Male (n = 25) Female (n = 20) Prob (F)**
Number of sampled farmers in each category 44 24 20
Average age (years) 42 (14) 38 (13) 55 (11) 0.000
Size of household 5.93 (3) 5.95 (3) 5.86 (2) 0.917
Number of active members of a household 2.41 (1) 2.40 (1) 2.43 (1) 0.942
Number of active women 1.16 (1) 1.09 (1) 1.43 (1) 0.113
Dependence ratio 1.64 1.61 1.72 0.823
Literacy rate 45% 56% 7%
Marital status
Married (%) 79 85 57 –
Single (%) 10 13 00 –
Widowed (%) 10 00 43 –
Divorced (%) 01 2 00 –
Experience in rice farming (years) 14 (9.4) 13.8 (8.2) 14.3 (10.4) 0.523
Source: INRAB Koussin-Le´le´ Survey, 2004
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation
** Probability statistic for the test of equality of mean values
Table 2 Summary statistics on farmer’s access to resources and use of inputs
Indicator Total (n = 45) Male (n = 25) Female (n = 20) Prob (F)**
Total rice area in (ha) 0.51 (0.30) 0.72 (0.24) 0.24 (0.01) 0.000
Maximum rice area (ha) 1.23 1.23 0.27
Minimum rice area (ha) 0.24 0.27 0.24
Quantity of fertilizer per hectare (kg/ha) 381 (127) 361 (124) 406 (130) 0.123
Quantity of insecticide hectare (l/ha) 0.90 (0.45) 0.95 (0.46) 0.84 (0.44) 0.242
Quantity of seed per hectare (kg/ha) 171 (52) 134 (42) 215 (18) 0.000
Quantity of labor per hectare (man days/ha) 105 (23) 95 (26) 118 (22) 0.002
Date of planting (age of nursery) (days) 22 (5.3) 19 (3.4) 25 (5.5) 0.000
Level of irrigation (distance of plot from
the main irrigation channel in meters)
2.61 (0.75) 2.7 (0.76) 2.55 (0.76) 0.695
Source: INRAB, Koussin-Le´le´ Survey, 2004
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation
** Probability statistic for the test of equality of mean values
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to the number of cropping seasons: Farmers often begin
preparations for the first cropping season in October. The
second cropping season starts soon after harvesting the first
season’s crop. Thus, farmers have the possibility of partic-
ipating in two cropping seasons if they harvest the first
season’s crop early. However, due to delays in the plowing
for the first season, women do not participate in the second
cropping season, which negatively impacts both their annual
incomes and total scheme incomes.
The patterns of use of other inputs (seed, fertilizer,
insecticide, and labor) are also shown in Table 2. As
explained above we do not make any hypothesis on the
existence of gender discrimination on these inputs. The
results indicate that, on average, rice farmers use 381 kg of
fertilizer, 0.9 liters of insecticide, 171 kg of seeds and 105
man-hours of labor/ha. The results further indicate that
while there are no significant differences in fertilizer
application rates between men and women, significant
differences are observed in their use of seed, labor, and
insecticides. Women’s fields have significantly higher seed
densities (215 kg/ha) than men’s fields (134 kg/ha).
Women also use significantly higher amounts of labor (118
man days/ha) than men (95 man days/ha).
Gender differences in average productivity and net rice
income
Table 3 presents productivity indicators for one cropping
season disaggregated by gender. The average yield of
farmers on the scheme is 4.47 tonnes/ha. The results
indicate that men have higher productivity than women per
unit of land, seeds, fertilizer, and labor. For example, the
average yield of men is 4.95 tonnes/ha while that of
women is 3.89 tonnes/ha and the difference is statistically
significant at the 5% significance level.
Net average rice incomes disaggregated by category of
farmer are also presented in Table 3. The results indicate
that the average net rice income of farmers in the scheme is
229,000 CFA per farmer,9 which is equivalent to an
average of 432,000 CFA/ha. This is consistent with find-
ings by Mongbo (2002) who reported incomes of 428,000
CFA/ha but higher than the finding of Agbazahou (2003)
who reported incomes of 354,000 CFA/ha on the same
scheme. This variation could be due to the difference in the
methods used and the elements considered in the calcula-
tion of the net income.10 The high net rice incomes
obtained suggest that rice production is a viable activity.
The finding is consistent with what was observed by
Agbazahou (2003), who reported that rice cropping gave
higher income than cotton cropping.
The results further show a significant difference between
net rice incomes of men and women. On average, women
generated only 85,000 CFA from rice farming against
350,000 CFA for men. Therefore men earn more than four
times the women’s average income.
Gender differences in technical efficiency and marginal
productivity
Table 4 presents results of estimates of Eqs. 1 and 3, which
are results of the frontier production function and the
determinants of technical efficiency, respectively. Farm
size, quantity of fertilizer, level of irrigation, and date of
planting are the main determinants of rice production in the
scheme. The results indicate that production increases with
farm size and fertilizer, while it decreases with days of late
planting and distance of the plot from the main irrigation
channel. With regard to determinants of technical ineffi-
ciency, the results indicate no statistically significant
difference in technical efficiency between men and women.
The dependent variable in the inefficiency equation (Eq. 3)
is the inefficiency index. Results indicate that highly
experienced farmers are more technically efficient; the
negative coefficient indicates that the more experience a
farmer has, the less inefficient he or she is. Technical
efficiency also declines as distance to the main water
channel increases. Furthermore, the results indicate that
late planting decreases technical efficiency; the positive
coefficient indicates that the more the days of late planting,
the more inefficient the farmer is.
Table 5 presents results of the marginal productivities
and technical efficiency indices disaggregated by gender as
predicted from the estimates of Eqs. 1 and 3. The results
indicate that the men have higher mean marginal produc-
tivities of land and fertilizer than the women. However, the
marginal productivities of seed and labor are negative for
both men and women. The average technical efficiency for
the whole sample is 0.84. This suggests that as a whole the
farmers in the rice scheme have the potential to increase
their productivity by 16% and consequently gain higher net
incomes using the same level of inputs. The results also
show that there are no statistically significant differences in
the level of technical efficiency between men (0.86) and
women (0.80) in the scheme.
Discussion
The results on discrimination against women in land dis-
tribution are consistent with the global Beninese context of
9 One dollar US ($US) equal 550 CFA (15 March 2006).
10 Mongbo and Agbazahou, as in this study, used the ‘‘gross
margins’’ or ‘‘marges brutes’’ method whereas Kinkingninhoun-
Medagbe´ (2003) who used the ‘‘net agricultural income net’’ (NAR)
method or ‘‘revenu agricole net’’ (RAN) method obtained 294,491.
The method used in this paper tends to account for fewer cost items.
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women’s limited access to land. Several studies in Benin
(Dijoux 2002; Sohinto 2001; Honlonkou 1994; Biaou 1993,
1991) indicate that the common cultural norms (local
system of access to land) discriminate against women who
do not inherit land. Female farmers don’t cultivate their
own land, but land borrowed from their husbands or from
their family members. In the best cases, women can receive
the marginal and small pieces of land. These findings are
also consistent with observations made by Basile (2001),
Dey Abbas (1997), Saito et al. (1994), Palmer (1991), and
Lubbock (1988), who observe that in most of the sub-
Saharan Africa countries, women are marginalized in land
allocation both in terms of the quality and the quantity of
the land. Similarly, Diemer and Van der Laan (1987) argue
that large irrigation schemes bring some forms of
inequality among the users. The most influential people end
up acquiring more land to the detriment of the weakest.
The discrimination against women in the Koussin-Le´le´
scheme suggests that although one would expect social
cultural norms leading to inequalities to disappear with the
Table 3 Average factor productivities and income of rice farmers
Average productivity of Total (n = 45) Male (n = 25) Female (n = 20) Prob (F)**
Land (tonnes/ha) 4.47 (1.03) 4.95 (0.78) 3.89 (1.02) 0.000
Seeds (kg/kg) 2.98 (1.37) 39.5 (10.9) 18.1 (4.4) 0.000
Fertilizers (kg/kg) 13.6 (9.0) 16.59 (11.3) 10 (2.4) 0.041
Insecticides (tonnes/ha) 5.59 (2.65) 5.97 (2.66) 5.10 (2.62) 0.192
Labor (kg/man day) 45.2 (15.4) 53.6 (11.2) 35.0 (13.5) 0.000
Date of planting (kg/day) 124.6 (100.9) 193.9 (87.7) 41.6 (20.6) 0.000
Income (thousands F CFA)
Net agricultural income 229 (174) 350 (149) 85 (8) 0.000
Net agricultural income per hectare 432 (174) 502 (156) 348 (159) 0.000
Source: INRAB, Koussin-Le´le´ Survey, 2004
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation
** Probability statistic for the test of equality of mean values
Table 4 Production frontier
model parameters estimates
Source: INRAB, Koussin-Le´le´
Survey, 2004
Production factors (in log) Estimated coefficient Standard error Significant level
Land 1.06 0.130 0.000
Seed -0.140 0.088 0.111
Fertilizer 0.080 0.042 0.058
Labor -0.012 0.110 0.913
Date of planting -0.582 0.151 0.000
Level of plots’ irrigation -0.147 0.067 0.028
Constant term 11.035 0.870 0.000
Number of observations = 44
Wald v2(9) = 882.74
Prob [ v2 = 0.0000
Determinants of technical inefficiency
Gender 0.062 0.105 0.555
Experience in rice production -0.009 0.004 0.012
Date of planting 0.025 0.009 0.007
Level of plots’ irrigation -0.218 0.072 0.007
Constant 0.239 0.390 0.539
/lnr2 -4.293 0.531 0.000
/ilgtgamma 0.585 1.118 0.601
r2 0.014 0.007
Gamma 0.642 0.256
sigma_u2 0.01 0.008
sigma_v2 0.005 0.002
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introduction of collective action groups, they seem to be
replicated in such groups. The low participation of women
in the scheme is considered as a form of discrimination
against them because women wanting to join the scheme
have been denied to do so since its establishment. This can
be attributed to a number of factors. The first relates to the
historical background of the scheme. At its establishment
men were recruited to work as laborers on the scheme
before it was handed over to them. It is unlikely in a male-
dominated society that women will seek employment as
laborers outside their home, a fact which probably led to
the recruitment of men only.
The second factor is directly related to the patriarchal
nature of the Beninese society. After the scheme was
handed over to men, they employed women as laborers.
These women started fighting for land in the scheme, but
their efforts did not yield any results until an intervention
by district officials which led to the acceptance of some
women into the scheme. It would appear that male oppo-
sition to increased female participation in the scheme is
attributed to the fact that women in the wider Benin
community do not own land (Honlonkou 1994; Biaou
1993, 1991). When women become members of the
scheme they automatically become land lords, which is
against the norms and values in most communities in
Benin. These facts and the findings of this paper suggest
that, unless facilitated by external intervention, it will be
very difficult for men to allow more women to participate
in the scheme. The smaller land holdings awarded to
women participants are also a great cause of concern par-
ticularly because it constrains them from increasing their
production. The main reason for small land holdings for
women is again rooted within the cultural norms of the
Beninese society as discussed above.
The other reason for small land holdings by women
relates to the lack of a mechanism of enforcement of laws
and regulations that can help in reducing the inequalities in
access to land between men and women. Contrary to the
rules and regulations set out in the bylaws of the scheme, a
farmer’s production performance is rarely taken into con-
sideration. In particular, the criteria of field management
and yield, which should be used to justify the increase or
reduction of land attributed to members, are not consid-
ered. Women in the scheme are awarded smaller plots of
land by the scheme management regardless of their per-
formance. The fact that historically women were allowed
membership in the scheme only after an external inter-
vention by district officials, suggests that it might be
difficult for men in the scheme to enforce rules leading to
women getting more land. Hence, in order to allow the
enforcement of the existing performance-based land
redistribution system in which better performers are sup-
posed to get larger holdings, there is a need for some form
of external intervention to facilitate the process.
There was also a general feeling among women during
the focus group discussion that the late plowing of their
fields resulting from their lack of timely access to the
plowing equipment (the third form of discrimination
described in Section ‘‘Results’’ above) is a deliberate
attempt by men to frustrate them from participating in the
scheme activities. Such delays affect the farming calendar
as they end up harvesting late. The timing of planting is a
very significant determinant of yield and of the possibility
of having a second cropping season.
Further, as a result of this discrimination, disputes
between men and women usually occur at the beginning of
each cropping season when women demand an increase in
their land size. These disputes inevitably lead to further
delays in plowing the women’s plots due to, among other
factors, delays in resolving the disputes as well as alleged
deliberate actions by the scheme leaders who are reported
to instruct operators of motorized plowing equipment to
delay the plowing of women’s plots. This makes it difficult
for women to abide by the farming calendar hence affect-
ing their productivity and their income.
Also as a result of late plowing, women fail to practice
double cropping which leads to significant losses in annual
income. This is consistent with the observations made by
Table 5 Marginal factor productivities and technical efficiencies by gender
Additional kilograms of paddy
for an additional unit of
Total (n = 45) Male (n = 25) Female (n = 20) Prob** (F)
Land (tonnes/ha) 4.74 (1.1) 5.25 (0.83) 4.13 (1.08) 0.000
Seeds (kg/kg) -4.17 (1.92) -5.53 (1.52) -2.53 (0.61) 0.000
Fertilizer (kg/kg) 1.07 (0.71) 1.31 (0.89) 0.79 (0.20) 0.015
Labor (kg/man day) -0.54 (0.18) -0.65 (0.13) -0.42 (0.16) 0.000
Date of planting (kg/day) -72.51 (58.71) -112.78 (51.01) -24.18 (11.98) 0.000
Technical efficiency (TE) 0.84 (0.14) 0.86 (0.12) 0.80 (0.16) 0.172
Source: INRAB, Koussin-Le´le´ Survey, 2004
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation
** Probability statistic for the test of equality of mean values
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Haefele et al. (2002) who point out that the relatively
demanding cropping calendar in West Africa leaves little
room for delay in activities. The non-participation of
women in the second cropping season implies a substantial
financial loss to the scheme.
As a result of the small land holdings, farmers in the
scheme tend to intensify their production through the
intensified use of inputs. For example, fertilizer use pat-
terns in the scheme show that the fertilizer application rates
are higher (381 kg/ha) than the recommended application
rates of around 200 kg/ha. This finding is consistent with
the agricultural intensification theory which posits that
smallholder farmers facing land constraints tend to inten-
sify their production systems through intensive use of
inputs. Nonetheless, as noted by Haefele et al. (2002), the
high rates of fertilizer application in the scheme may also
be attributed to high fertilizer losses incurred in most of the
irrigated rice in West Africa. It is estimated that in the
Sahel region, for example, about 70% of the fertilizer
applied to rice plants is lost. The seeding densities are also
higher (171 kg/ha) than the recommended (70 kg/ha). Seed
intensification may also be attributed, in this case, to the
low cost of seed.
The higher average yield in the scheme can be attributed
to, among other reasons, long experience in rice farming
since most farmers have been growing rice since their
youth. Nonetheless, there still remains a significant yield
deficiency as the potential yield from irrigated rice is
around 8 tonnes/ha once relevant constraints are addressed.
The marginal productivity of land is higher than its average
productivity, suggesting that farmers in the scheme are
experiencing increasing marginal returns associated with
being in the early stage of the production function before
the point of diminishing marginal returns is reached.
The reported productivities of women farmers in the
scheme are significantly lower than those of men. The
results also show that men had higher marginal produc-
tivities than women. By just looking at the marginal
productivity, one could assume that men are more efficient
than women as their marginal productivities are higher.
However, a closer analysis shows that the larger marginal
productivity among men is mainly due to the combined
effect of larger land holding size and increasing marginal
returns to land. Thus, since both men and women are
experiencing increasing marginal returns to land, it follows
that those with larger land holdings will have higher mar-
ginal returns and higher productivity. Standard results of
production economics (see, for example, Chambers 1988)
tell us that average product is equal to marginal product at
the point where the average product curve is at its maxi-
mum, with the marginal product curve crossing the former
from above. Our results so far show that the marginal
product of land is higher than its average product,
suggesting that the average product of land is still
increasing and has not yet reached it maximum. Thus in
this stage of the production function, those with large land
holdings will have high average productivities than those
with smaller land holdings. This explains why women who
have smaller holdings have lower average and marginal
productivities.
These findings are consistent with earlier observations
by Jovanovic (1982), Kalaitzandonakes et al. (1992),
Sharma et al. (1999), Lundvall and Battese (2000), and
Alvarez and Arias (2004), who have all reported a posi-
tive relation between average total productivity and farm
size. The utilization of some production factors such as
labor, for example, often does not increase in a linear
form with the farm size. The producers that have a small
land area often tend to over-utilize labor and other inputs,
thus affecting their productivity. These findings suggest
that land is the main constraint to productivity for the
farmers in the scheme and that the differences in pro-
ductivity observed between men and women are mainly
due to the discrimination on land to which women are
subjected.
The comparison of the estimated technical efficiency
indices between men and women, which shows that women
are on average as technically efficient as men, provides
further evidence that low productivity among women is not
due to inefficiency in resource use but is rather due to their
smaller land holdings. The high technical efficiency for
women can be explained by the fact that although the
women are newcomers in the scheme, they have a vast
experience in rice farming based on their previous expe-
rience as laborers on the same scheme. This is consistent
with observations by Moock (1976), Ram and Singh
(1988), Bindlish and Evenson (1993), and Dey Abbas
(1997), who measured gender differential productivity and
found that women were as technically efficient as men.
Thus, the lower measured productivity of female rice
farmers in the scheme is not due to technical inefficiency,
but is mainly due to the discrimination against them in
access to land and equipment. In the strict sense, gender
differences are likely to be less important for married
women whose husbands may compensate for the effects of
gender discrimination. However, in this study about half of
the women were married, and there were no significant
differences in the productivity between married and
unmarried women, suggesting that husbands did not con-
tribute much to reducing the effect of discrimination on
women. This finding is plausible because husbands’ lack of
membership in the scheme makes it difficult for them to
influence the allocation of land that would benefit their
wives from outside the scheme.
The findings of this paper and the discussion above
suggest that allotting more land to women could increase
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women’s productivity and income. Allocating more land to
women will have no effect on the overall scheme efficiency
but will lead to improvements in the productivity and
incomes of women and, therefore, to gender equity.
Conclusion
Collective action groups are believed to be a powerful
development tool that can be used to reduce inequalities in
several dimensions among the participating individuals
while enhancing community development. However,
unless carefully managed, they can potentially replicate
inequalities that exist in the communities from which
participants are drawn, leading to the exploitation of the
marginalized groups and to inefficiency. This study tests
this hypothesis by examining gender discrimination in
access to production resources and its effects on produc-
tivity, income, and technical efficiency among rice farmers
in a collective action rice scheme.
The study found evidence of inequality in membership,
land distribution, and equipment use among rice farmers in
the Koussin-Le´le´ irrigation scheme. The women in the
communities served by the scheme are subjected to dis-
crimination as evidenced by their low participation, smaller
land holdings, and their limited access to equipment which
leads to delays in plowing their plots. As a result of these
delays, women cannot practice double cropping, leading to
income losses for the scheme and for women in particular.
It is further observed that the discrimination against
women affects their average productivity, their marginal
productivity, and their income. But women are found to be
as technically efficient as men. This observation implies
that increasing land allocated to women, combined with an
equitable access to equipment that enables women to plow
their plots in time and to participate in the second cropping
season, would lead to improvements in the productivity and
incomes of women.
This discrimination appears to be partly driven by the
socially constructed norms within Beninese culture, in
which women have limited land rights. The existing bylaws
which allow performance-based increments in allocated
land can, if enforced, reduce this inequality. However, the
sensitivity of land issues suggests the need for some sort of
external intervention. Communal authorities and leaders of
agricultural development projects can intervene to facilitate
the process of land redistribution. A lesson from the find-
ings of this study is that if not carefully managed,
collective action groups may replicate inequalities in the
society from which participants are drawn. Thus, unless
complemented with good governance, they are not a pan-
acea to inequality problems in access to productive
resources among different social classes and genders.
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